Introduction
In these reports we discuss two judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and two views of the Human Rights Committee (HRC). The Slivenko judgment is important for its considerations on private life, home and family life in relation to the situation of family members who lived practically throughout their lives in a country expelling them. The Shamsa judgment introduces the requirement of a judicial decision ordering immigration detention under Article 5 ECHR. In the Judge views, the HRC changes its standing jurisprudence on deporting or extraditing a person to a country where he is under death penalty. In the Bakhtiyari views, the HRC sets standards for long term immigration detention and for the legal remedies for reviewing the lawfulness of such detention. See also the HRC's Baban views, summarily mentioned in our comment. Further, the Bakhtiyari views are interesting for the considerations of the HRC on the manner in which the right to family life must be safeguarded in expelling family members and for the HRC's firm statement on the paramount importance of 'the best interests of the child' as laid down in Article 24 CCPR.
In this introduction, we further draw the attention to the ECtHR's judgment of 22 April 2004 on Radovanovic v. Austria, app. 42703/98, in which the second generation case law under Article 8 ECHR was applied to the situation of a single young adult who arrived at a young age in Austria and who was served a residence prohibition of unlimited duration after having been convicted to six months unconditional imprisonment and 24 months suspended for aggravated robbery. The Court was of the opinion that the applicant's right to respect for his private and family life under Article 8 was violated whereas a residence prohibition of unlimited duration was an overly rigorous measure. The first applicant in this case is Mrs. Tatjana Slivenko. She was born in Estonia in 1959, but at the age of one month she moved to Latvia together with her parents. In 1980 she married Mr. Slivenko, a Russian officer who was transferred to Latvia in 1977. In Latvia their daughter, Ms. Karina Slivenko, the second applicant, was born in 1981. Latvia regained independence from the USSR in 1991. In 1992 the Russian Federation assumed jurisdiction over the former Soviet armed forces, including those stationed in Latvia. In 1993 the first applicant and her daughter, as well as the first applicant's parents, were registered as ex-USSR citizens. Mr. Slivenko had become a Russian citizen somewhere in the early 1990s and continued his service in the Russian army until his discharge in 1994. On 30 April 1994 a treaty between Latvia and Russia on the withdrawal of Russian troops was signed and became effective on the same date. On 7 October 1994 Mr. Slivenko applied for a temporary residence permit in Latvia by reason of his marriage to a permanent resident of Latvia. This was refused on the ground that, as a Russian military officer, he was required to leave Latvia as a result of the treaty of 30 April 1994. On 29 November 1994 the applicants' registration as former USSR citizens was annulled on the ground of Mr. Slivenko's military status. On an unspecified date in 1996 Mr. Slivenko moved to Russia, while the applicants remained in Latvia. But after various court actions and two short periods of detention the applicants moved to Russia to join Mr. Slivenko on 11 July 1999. The first applicant's parents continued living in Latvia on the ground of their status as 'ex-USSR citizens'.
The applicants complained that their removal from Latvia violated Article 8 of the Convention. The Court agrees as far as the right to respect for 'private life' and 'home' are concerned. The applicants 'had developed, uninterruptedly since birth, the network of personal, social and economic relations that make up the private life of every human being'. Furthermore, as a result of the removal the applicants lost the flat in which they had lived in Riga. In contrast, by removing the complete core family, the Latvian authorities did not break up the family. Under the Convention, the applicants were not entitled to choose in which of the two countries -Latvia or Russia -to continue or re-establish an effective family life. Furthermore, the existence of 'family life' could not be relied on by the applicants in relation to the first applicant's elderly parents, adults who did not belong to the core family and who have not been shown to have been dependent members of the applicants' family. As to a possible justification of the interference in the applicants' 'private life' and 'home' the Court notes that the Latvian authorities overstepped their 'margin of appreciation'. The removal was -due to the existence of the Latvian-Russian treaty -in accordance with the law and served a legitimate aim (the protection of Latvia's national security). But in this particular case Latvia failed to prove that the continued presence of Mr. Slivenko, who was not in active military service anymore, and his wife and daughter could be regarded as endangering the national security of Latvia. The applicants also complained that their detention was in breach
